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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2016, Brazil held the Summer Olympic Games.1 Undoubtedly, 
since emerging as the host, Brazil has made endless efforts to show 
the international stage that its country can maintain the event’s 
glamor and glory.2 Unfortunately, behind the massive stadiums and 
venues, lie some of the most miserable penitentiary facilities in the 
world.3 Windowless cells usually shared by twenty-five men, forced 
 
      * Layla Medina is a 2017 J.D. Candidate at American University Washington 
College of Law. She would like to thank her family for their immense support and 
love throughout law school and this writing process. She would also like to thank 
her faculty advisor, Professor Juan E. Méndez, for his generous time and guidance 
with this comment. Without his tremendous feedback, this would not have been 
possible.  
 1.  See generally Olympic Games, Rio 2016, http://www.rio2016.com/en/ 
olympic-games (last visited March 13, 2016) (hosting the games from August 5, 
2016 until August 21, 2016).   
 2.  Kiko Itasaka, 2016 Olympics: Rio Upbeat Despite Zika, Economic Woes 
in Brazil, NBC, Feb. 21, 2016,  http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/2016-
olympics-rio-upbeat-despite-zika-economic-woes-brazil-n510961 (discussing the 
efforts Brazil has made to prepare Rio for the Olympics).  
 3.  See HUM. RTS. WATCH, Brazil: Where Inmates Run the Show, YOUTUBE 
(Oct. 20, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sqIl3XpReuY (“Prison 
conditions in Brazil are deplorable. They are a grave human rights disaster.”). 
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to sleep on the floor, infested with disease and smells of urine, are far 
from the glamorous images the rest of the world will get to see.4 
Brazil features the fourth-largest prison population in the world.5 
Although Brazil is home to more than two hundred million people,6 
its incarceration rate is growing faster than its overall population.7 
Today, more than six hundred thousand inmates occupy cell space 
designed for approximately three hundred fifty thousand.8 It is 
estimated that if incarceration levels remain the same as those 
presented over the last two decades,9 in 2022 Brazil will surpass one 
million inmates.10 
For the past twenty years, Brazil’s prisons have been plagued with 
chronic human rights violations.11 Particularly, Brazil’s lack of 
 
 4.  Id.  
 5.  See Patrick Bruha, Prison System In Brazil, BRAZIL BUS., 
http://thebrazilbusiness.com/article/prison-system-in-brazil (last updated Jan. 23, 
2015) (trailing behind Russia, United States, and China).  
 6.  See id. (stating that in 2014, Brazil was the fifth most populous state in the 
world, and most populous in South America).   
 7.  See Stephanie Nolen, Brazil’s Brutal Prison System in Crisis Proves a 
Tough Cage to Rattle, Globe & Mail (Oct. 4, 2015, 10:01 PM), 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/brazils-brutal-prison-system-in-
crisis-proves-a-tough-cage-to-rattle/article26646883/ (last updated Oct. 5, 2015, 
9:58 AM) (finding that the incarceration rate grew seven percent a year in the past 
fifteen years; ten times faster than the country’s overall population growth); see 
also Matthew Oster, Brazilian Prisons Face Tough Road after New Criminal Law 
Passed, EUROMONITOR INT’L BLOG (Aug. 13, 2015), http://blog.euromonitor.com/ 
2015/08/brazilian-prisons-face-tough-road-after-new-criminal-law-passed.html 
(illustrating that the prison growth rate from 2001-2014, 143%, far outpaced the 
general population growth, 13%)). 
 8.  See Ben Tavener, This Report on Brazil’s Prisons Exposes a ‘Human 
Rights Disaster’, VICE NEWS, (Oct. 20, 2015, 7:00 PM) https://news.vice.com/ 
article/this-report-on-brazils-prisons-exposes-a-human-rights-disaster 
(documenting a 161% increase in the prison population from 2000 to 2014, and 
estimating a current prison population of 680,000).  
 9.  See INST. OF THE DEFENSE OF THE RIGHT TO DEFENSE, Pre-trial Detainees 
in Brazil and the Custody 2, http://www.cnj.jus.br/files/conteudo/arquivo/2016/02/ 
dea49c0ba2487f842717d146bf8d3491.pdf (last visited May 23, 2016) [hereinafter 
Pre-trial Detainees in Brazil] (stating the national incarceration levels must remain 
in the range of 7% a year).  
 10.  Id. 
 11.  See World Report 2013: Brazil, HUM. RTS. WATCH, 
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/brazil (last visited Oct. 
25, 2015) [hereinafter World Report 2013: Brazil] (documenting prison conditions 
in 2012); see also Amnesty Int’l, Brazil: “Death has Arrived”: Prison Massacre at 
the Casa de Detenção, Amnesty Int’l 2-4 (Apr. 30, 1993), 
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custody hearings has greatly promoted torture and ill-treatment of 
detainees by prison officials, and has caused overcrowding in 
facilities.12 In a prison system that is inherently elitist, only those 
pertaining to the lowest social classes suffer.13 The system provides 
better-conditioned cells to detainees with a university diploma or 
public connections, while the majority of the population, who are 
black, poor, and uneducated are packed into tiny cells with 
unwarrantable hygiene conditions.14 Unfortunately, the Brazilian 
public continues to support the mass incarceration and cruel 
treatment of these prisoners.15 Not to mention, politicians’ careers are 
determined by their stance on criminal punishment.16 Showing no 
mercy for those deemed dangerous is a prerequisite in elections.17 
This Comment asserts that Brazil’s denial of custody hearings 
violates two major provisions in international law. Part II of this 
Comment introduces a brief history of Brazil’s prison system, its 
criminal procedure code, and its Constitution.18 This part also 
 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr19/008/1993/en/ [hereinafter Death 
has Arrived] (analyzing prison conditions in 1992).   
 12.  See World Report 2013: Brazil, supra note 11 (citing the United Nations 
Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment’s findings of “repeated and consistent” accounts of inmate beatings in 
police custody and the obligation to sleep in unsanitary cells without food or water, 
while demonstrating how consistent delays within the justice system contribute to 
overcrowding, nearly 175,000 inmates are in pre-trial detention).   
 13.  See Robert Muggah & Ilona Szabo de Carvalho, Behind bars in Brazil is 
no place you want to be, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2014), 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-muggah-brazil-prisons-20140122-
story.html (describing the Brazilian prison system as one in which inmates with 
public connections or a higher class are issued better conditions).  
 14.  See Survey Shows that 56% of Prisoners in Brazil are Youth, DEEO (June 
23, 2015), http://deeo.net/tag/prison-system-exceeds/ (citing InfoPen’s numbers, 
which say that sixty-seven percent are black, fifty-three percent have not 
completed elementary school, and fifty-seven percent are single). 
 15.  See OBI N. I. EBBE, COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEMS: POLICING, JUDICIARY, AND CORRECTIONS 270 (2013) 
(comparing Brazil’s prison system with Denmark’s, indicating that Brazil’s thirty 
years of strict militarism and harsh controls contributed to the disregard of rights 
for members of lower socioeconomic class).  
 16.  See Juan E. Méndez, Ring the Alarm: Brazil’s Prison System is in Serious 
Trouble, World Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/juan-e-m/ring-the-alarm-
brazils-pr_b_483744.html (last updated May 25, 2010).  
 17.  See id. (referring to near unanimous public opinion in favor of a ‘tough on 
crime’ approach).   
 18.  See infra Part II.A-E. 
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presents Article 9(3) and Article 7 of the ICCPR. Part III argues that 
the discretionary language in Brazil’s criminal procedure code 
regarding custody hearings, is violating Article 9 of the ICCPR.19 
Additionally, it argues that depriving Brazilian citizens of a custody 
hearing, leads to an alarming rate of torture by government officials, 
a violation of Article 7 of the ICCPR. As a result, Brazil’s 
overcrowded prison facilities cause physical and mental pain to 
prisoners, also a violation of Article 7.20 
Part IV recommends that Brazil quickly enact a law that 
unequivocally grants all detainees a custody hearing within twenty-
four hours of arrest.21 Most importantly, Brazil must ensure that all 
states nationwide adhere to this strict procedural rule. Part IV also 
recommends that Brazil renovate its prison facilities to provide 
sanitary conditions, such as access to beds, clean water, food, and 
medical services. Lastly, it recommends that an independent 
judiciary body, such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
sanction Brazil and hold it accountable for the inhumane treatment of 
detainees by prison officials. Part V concludes that Brazil’s prison 
reform will only be resolved by changing the public’s perspective on 
criminal punishment and by electing politicians that will improve 
prison conditions nationwide.22 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. A HISTORY OF PUNISHMENT: BRAZIL’S VIEW ON 
INCARCERATION 
Brazil’s history with its penitentiary system began in the 1830’s.23 
It did not take long before states across Brazil lost motivation for 
prison reform and were simply using its detention facilities to fix the 
behavior of noncompliant slaves.24 Nonetheless, after the abolition of 
 
 19.  See infra Part III.A-B.  
 20.  See infra Part III.B(b).  
 21.  See infra Part IV. 
 22.  See infra Part V. 
 23.  E.g., MITCHEL P. ROTH, PRISONS AND PRISON SYSTEMS: A GLOBAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA 41-42 (2006) (stating that Brazil became one of the first Latin 
American countries to adopt a prison system after copying Jeremy Bentham’s 
panopticon design for his correction facilities).  
 24.  See id. (expressing how the “Casa de Correcao,” like some prisons, broke 
its promise as a reformatory facility and became a “house of disease and death”); 
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slavery,25 the country tried to make an effort to reform its prison 
system.26 In 1920, Brazil became the first Latin American country to 
incorporate the telephone pole design27 into its Casa de Detenção 
(Carandiru Prison) in São Paulo.28 Upon completion in 1956, this 
facility was praised as the nation’s model prison because it complied 
with its 1890 criminal code.29 In 1992, Carandiru gained notoriety for 
its stern overcrowding30 and violence; consequently, it became 
known as one of the most dangerous prisons in the world.31 That 
year, the famous Carandiru massacre,32 triggered by a prisoner revolt 
because of prison overcrowding, illustrated the true reflection of 
 
see also RICARDO D. SALVATORE & CARLOS AGUIRRE, THE BIRTH OF THE 
PENITENTIARY IN LATIN AMERICA: ESSAYS ON CRIMINOLOGY, PRISON REFORM, 
AND SOCIAL CONTROL, 1830-1940 236 (1996) (finding that the Brazilian Congress 
wanted to establish “houses of correction” in each province in 1832; however, it 
was difficult to implement because provinces lacked the adequate resources to 
replace their old prisons with new ones).  
 25.  E.g., INT’L BAR ASS’N HUMAN RIGHTS INST., ONE IN FIVE: THE CRISIS IN 
BRAZ.’S PRISONS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 37 (2010) [hereinafter ONE IN 
FIVE] (stating that Brazil was “the last country in the Western Hemisphere to 
abolish slavery,” doing so in 1888). 
 26.  See ROTH, supra note 23, at 42 (stating that by the twentieth century, some 
improvements were made in several prisons, including Fernando de Noronha, Rio 
de Janeiro, Bahia, and Recife, but juvenile detentions had not received the same 
type of reorganization).  
 27.  See MARY BOSWORTH, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRISONS & CORRECTIONAL 
FACILITIES 300 (2005) (explaining how a telephone pole design has several wings 
constructed parallel to one another and are connected by a central passageway that 
divides the building into multiple sections, facilitating the transportation of 
prisoners from one part of the prison into the other).  
 28.  See ROTH, supra note 23, at 42 (indicating that Carandiru Prison  was 
originally designed for a capacity of 1,300 people).  
 29.  See CRIME AND PUNISHMENT AROUND THE WORLD 63 (Janet P. Stamatel et 
al. eds., 2010) (relating Brazil’s enactment of the Republican Penal Code in 1890, 
which created the correctional penitentiary regime after the abolition of slavery).   
 30.  See World Report 2013: Brazil, supra note 11, at 2-3 (demonstrating that 
during the peak of its use, the prison housed over 8,000 prisoners, while only 1,000 
officers were employed to control them).  
 31.  Julian Kimble, The 50 Craziest Prisons and Jails in the World, COMPLEX 
(Aug. 14, 2015), http://www.complex.com/pop-culture/2015/08/the-50-craziest-
prisons-and-jails-in-the-world/ (listing Carandiru as the fifth “craziest” prison in 
the world, primarily for the 1992 massacre in which 111 inmates died).  
 32.  See World Report 2013: Brazil, supra note 11, at 3 (describing the 
massacre: on October 2, 1992, heavily armed military police stormed the facility to 
suppress an uprising by prisoners, killing one 111 inmates and wounding thirty-
five).  
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Brazil’s horrific prison system.33 The hundreds of prisoner killings 
by police officials received worldwide attention; yet, it failed to 
establish any substantial changes to the modern-day prisons.34 In fact, 
a public opinion poll taken after the massacre showed that a 
significant number of people supported the brutal actions taken by 
police and did not immediately care to hold the officials accountable 
for the murders.35 
After Brazil’s transition into a full democracy,36 crime had a huge 
impact on political discourse, and defending civil rights was seen as 
defending criminality.37 In the end, politicians who were “soft on 
crime” were not elected, and those who favored tougher measures 
were securing political seats and changing strategies in prison 
administration.38 In 2014, similar trends showed that Brazil’s biggest 
public concern was crime, and that many people were unmoved by 
the fact that police killed individuals perceived as criminals.39 
 
 
 33.  See Carandiru and the Scandal of Brazil’s Medieval Prison System, 
AMNESTY INT’L. (Apr. 15, 2013), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2013/ 
04/carandiru-and-scandal-brazil-s-medieval-prison-system/ [hereinafter Carandiru 
and the Scandal] (witnessing “a toxic recipe of inhuman detention conditions 
mixed with the ‘shoot first, ask later’ policy” that São Paulo police have adopted). 
 34.  See Jacey Fortin, Twenty Years After Carandiru Massacre, Brazil’s 
Prisons Still Deplorable, INT’L. BUS. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2012, 9:44 AM), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/twenty-years-after-carandiru-massacre-brazils-prisons-
still-deplorable-799697 (stating that the conditions of prisons across the country 
have not improved in the past twenty years). 
 35.  But see World Report 2015: Brazil, HUM. RTS. WATCH, 
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/brazil (last accessed 
Nov. 29, 2015) [hereinafter World Report 2015: Brazil] (noting that although it 
took more than twenty years, a total of seventy-three police officers were 
convicted in 2013 and 2014 for their participation in the Carandiru massacre).   
 36.  See INT’L BAR ASS’N HUMAN RIGHTS INST., supra note 25, at 37  
(identifying a return to civilian leadership in 1985).  
 37.  See id. at 32 (including Rio de Janeiro’s governor Leonel Brizola and São 
Paulo’s governor Franco Montero, who became increasingly unpopular when they 
maintained their platforms respecting human rights).  
 38.  See id. (stating these politicians supported the “shoot-to-kill” policies for 
prison officials).  
 39.  MICHAEL REID, BRAZIL: THE TROUBLED RISE OF A GLOBAL POWER 191 
(2014) (“When crime is high, human rights disappear.”); see also INT’L BAR ASS’N 
HUMAN RIGHTS INST., supra note 25 (maintaining that another reason the public 
does not care about detainees is because most of them are poor, uneducated, and 
politically powerless).   
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B. ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE: OVERVIEW OF BRAZIL’S 
PRISON SYSTEM 
Brazil is a federal republic with twenty-six state governments and 
the federal district of Brasilia.40 There is only one national criminal 
code41 applicable throughout the entire country;42 nevertheless, the 
administration of prisons is the responsibility of each state.43 
Individual states determine how it will manage its prisons; however, 
the management must abide by Brazil’s most detailed prison 
guidelines, found in the Law of the Execution of Sentences 
(“LEP”).44 The LEP was adopted in 1984,45 and it sets out the 
country’s aspirations for its penitentiary system.46 Since the LEP 
acknowledges the basic human rights of prisoners, all States are 
obligated to supplement its penal system with regulations that are in 
line with the national law.47 The only exception to that is when a 
 
 40.  E.g., Law of Brazil: State Structure, OBERHEIDEN L. GRP. PLLC, 
http://www.lawofbrazil.com/legal-system/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2016) [hereinafter 
Law of Brazil: State Structure] (explaining that both the federal and state level 
have three separate branches: legislative, executive, and judicial).  
 41.  See CRIME AND PUNISHMENT AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 29, at 63 
(emphasizing that in 1940, Brazil enacted the new penal code, known as the 
Código Penal Basileiro, which is the fundamental piece of Brazilian penal law 
used today).  
 42.  See JOANNE MARINER & JAMES CAVALLARO, BEHIND BARS IN BRAZIL 14 
(Anne Manuel & Cynthia Brown eds., 1998) (stating that in Brazil, every state 
must apply the same substantive criminal law, in contrast with the United States, 
where each state has its own criminal code).  
 43.  See id. (explaining how Brazil’s “prisons, jails, and police lock-ups are 
administered by its state governments,” unlike most Latin American countries, 
such as Chile, Colombia, and Peru, where the federally administered prison system 
is under the Ministry of Justice).  
 44.  See IMPRISONMENT TODAY AND TOMORROW: INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON PRISONERS CONDITIONS 110 (Dirk Dirk van Zyl Smit & Frieder 
Dünkel eds., 2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter IMPRISONMENT TODAY AND TOMORROW].  
 45.  See CRIME AND PUNISHMENT AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 29, at 63 
(explaining that the LEP became part of the General Penal Code, which is the 
fundamental piece of Brazilian penal legislation).  
 46.  See MARINER & CAVALLARO, supra note 42, at 11-12 (stating that this 
modern piece of legislation provides for the respect of prisoners’ human rights, 
while also containing numerous provisions mandating individualized treatment, 
protecting inmates’ substantive and procedural rights, and guaranteeing them 
medical, legal, educational, social, religious and material assistance).  
 47.  See IMPRISONMENT TODAY AND TOMORROW, supra note 44, at 110 
(acknowledging that although the LEP is a modern law abiding by the United 
Nations Standard Minimum Rules, its provisions are usually overlooked or ignored 
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state cannot follow a guideline due to a particular characteristic of its 
region.48 
In Brazil, the state penal systems are governed by the state’s 
executive branch.49 For example, it is common for the state 
governor50 to act as the secretary of justice and manage prisons, 
while the secretary of public security controls police lock-ups.51 Yet, 
this does not mean that the federal government is completely out of 
the picture when it comes to the overall structure of its prison 
system.52 
Brazil’s federal government has several cabinet-level ministries in 
charge of executing laws nationwide, including the Ministry of 
Justice.53 Within this institution, lie two other important executive 
organs responsible for observing and implementing criminal law and 
policy- the National Penitentiary Department (“DEPEN”) and the 
National Council on Criminal and Penitentiary Policy (“CNPCP”).54 
The former is primarily responsible for administrative matters, such 
as supervising states and the enactment of prison guidelines, and the 
construction of new buildings.55 Additionally DEPEN, manages the 
 
by the states). 
 48.  See id. at 111 (citing appropriate characteristics for an exception as being 
cultural, climatic, administrative or financial in nature).  
 49.  MARINER & CAVALLARO, supra note 42, at 15. 
 50.  See, e.g., Law of Brazil: State Structure, supra note 40 (identifying the 
head of the state’s executive branch as the governor). 
 51.  See MARINER & CAVALLARO, supra note 42, at 15 (asserting that facilities 
known as cadeias públicas or cadeiões, or jails, may fall under either secretariat).   
 52.  See id. at 16 (identifying two federal agencies concerned with prison 
policy: the Penitentiary Department, concerned with practical matters, and the 
National Council on Criminal and Penitentiary Policy, concerned with guiding 
intellectual policy).  
 53.  See Leandro Záccaro Garcia, Brazil and the Brazilian Correctional System, 
in UNAFEI, Annual Report for 2012 and Resource Material, Series No. 90 124, 
125 (2013), http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/RS_No90/No90_15PA_Garcia.pdf 
(stating that the Ministry of Justice is part of the Federal Government and it is the 
most important legal body responsible for planning, coordinating, and 
administering criminal law and policy).  
 54.  See generally Common Questions: Criminal Policy, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE 
FED. GOV’T, http://www.justica.gov.br/seus-direitos/politica-penal (last visited 
Apr. 18, 2016) (explaining the department levels within the Ministry of Justice). 
 55.  See id.; see also BRAZIL TODAY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LIFE IN THE 
REPUBLIC 473 (John J. Crocitti ed., 2012) [hereinafter BRAZIL TODAY] (stating that 
the “DEPEN” has been cooperating with the twenty-six state prison systems since 
October 1975).   
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National Penitentiary Fund (“FUNPEN”), implemented in 1994 in an 
effort to manage prison resources, improve overcrowding, unhealthy 
conditions, and prisoner-on prisoner violence.56 
On the other hand, CNPCP provides in-depth research on prisons 
and publicizes the national prison census every two years.57 The 
CNPCP also recommends legislation to fix the issues it finds most 
prevalent, such as overcrowding.58 It is worthy of noting that in 1994, 
the CNPCP adopted the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules 
for the Treatment of Prisoners,59 which addresses a variety of issues 
regarding prison formation and the framework for monitoring and 
inspecting prisoners’ treatment worldwide.60 
C. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE AND CONSTITUTION: BRAZIL’S 
LAWS ON CUSTODY HEARINGS AND ARBITRARY ARREST 
1. Criminal Procedure Code 
Custody hearings are designed to prevent “unlawful arbitrary 
imprisonment” of individuals suspected of a crime while they await 
trial.61 The procedure includes being brought promptly before a judge 
or an independent magistrate when arrested for a crime.62 Yet, 
Brazil’s criminal system frequently deprives detainees of this 
 
 56.  See, e.g., BRAZIL TODAY, supra note 55, at 473 (stating that FUNPEN 
helped finance states’ construction and prison establishments because they were 
unable to support the costs themselves). 
 57.  See MARINER & CAVALLARO, supra note 42, at 16 (containing useful 
information and statistics on prisoners, prison staff, and the conditions of a 
particular prison).   
 58.  See id. (stating that the CNPCP recommends draft legislation on prison 
reform and related issues). 
 59.  See Resolução Nº14, de 11 de Novembro de 1994, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA 
UNIÃO [D.O.U] de 2.12.1994 (Braz.) (establishing minimum standards for the 
treatment of prisoners in Brazil).  
 60.  See id. (reinforcing the idea that these rules are the primary legal standards 
in international law regarding detention treatment, such as contact with the outside 
world, issuing of books, medical services, education, etc.).  
 61.  See Brazil: Approve Critical Justice Reform, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Aug. 12, 
2015), https://www.hrw.org/pt-br/node/280143 [hereinafter Brazil: Approve 
Critical Justice] (explaining that custody hearings afford a judge the opportunity 
evaluate the basis of a prisoner’s detention and determine whether prisoner should 
be incarcerated while awaiting trial). 
 62.  See id.   
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fundamental due process guarantee.63 The lack of implementation 
gives rise to the “arrest first, ask later” policy, where the majority of 
arrestees sit in pretrial detention,64 without formal charges, while 
routinely housed with convicted criminals.65 
This problem stems from the language provided in Brazil’s 
criminal procedure code regarding custody hearings.66 For example, 
if a citizen is arrested in flagrante delicto (caught in the act), the 
criminal procedure code only requires the police to submit an arrest 
report to the judge within twenty-four hours, not bring the actual 
detainee.67 Surprisingly in Brazil, flagrante delicto arrests can also 
mean that the police receive an anonymous tip regarding an 
individual.68 The police can proceed to arrest the individual on that 
sole basis, regardless of whether or not police officer caught the 
individual “in the act” of committing a crime.69 In both cases, the 
judge decides whether or not the citizen should be held in pretrial 
detention or given other precautionary measures exclusively on the 
report provided by the police.70 This means that police can keep a 
 
 63.  See id. (noting that pretrial detainees waiting for a hearing may have to 
wait months or years before going before a judge).  
 64.  See Pre-trial Detainees in Brazil, supra note 9, at 2 (stating that 41% of 
the prison population are temporary detainees who are being held in custody 
without trial).  
 65.  See Brazil: Prison Crisis Spurs Rights Reform, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 8, 
2015), https://www.hrw.org/print/267851 [hereinafter Brazil: Prison Crisis] 
(noting that pretrial detainees are routinely housed among convicted criminals in 
violation of international standards).   
 66.  CÓDIGO DE PROCESO PENAL [C.P.C.] [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 
306, §1 (Braz.).  
 67.  Id. (“Em até 24 (vinte e quatro) horas após a realização da prisão, será 
encaminhado ao juiz competente o auto de prisão em flagrante e. . . .”) [exact 
language].  
 68.  Interview with Juan E. Méndez, Special Rapporteur on Torture, United 
Nations, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 2016) (explaining that during his visit to 
Brazil, he was concerned about police using an elastic definition of flagrancia that 
does not resemble the circumstance of actually witnessing the commission of a 
crime, and instead often turns into a justification for illegal searches and seizures 
or illegal investigative measures).   
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Maria Laura Canineu, The Right to a “Custody Hearing” under 
International Law, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 3, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/news/ 
2014/02/03/right-custody-hearing-under-international-law (explaining that only 
police files are submitted to the judge when determining whether the arrestee 
should be detained while awaiting trial).   
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citizen detained with formal judicial authorization for several months 
without giving the detainee the chance to actually see the judge in 
person.71 
In an effort to combat the overwhelming rate of pretrial detainees, 
Brazil enacted Federal Law No. 12.403 in July 2011.72 Known as the 
preventative measures act, this piece of legislation was implemented 
to ensure that judges used the alternative measures listed in Article 
319 of the Criminal Procedure Code first, while resorting to pretrial 
detention in extreme circumstances only.73 Unfortunately, even after 
its enactment, surveys administered by civil society administrations 
demonstrate that the legislative efforts have not yet had an impact on 
judges’ reasoning, who continue to justify pretrial detention as the 
best measure for those being accused of crimes.74 In fact, the Instituto 
Sou da Paz75 discovered that from April to July 2012, 61.3% of the 
flagrante delicto arrests were converted into pretrial detention. 
More recently, the National Justice Council (“CNJ”) and the 
Ministry of Justice “(MJ”) launched a pilot program known as the 
“Custody Hearing Project” throughout the country.76 The goal of the 
program is to ensure that states fulfill their obligations to bring every 
detained person promptly before a judge, who will (a) rule on the 
 
 71.  See id. (noting that although the Criminal Procedure Code requires a 
hearing within sixty days, in practice, detainees may have to wait months before 
seeing a judge because the Code does not specify when that sixty day period 
begins).  
 72.  See Pre-trial Detainees in Brazil, supra note 9, at 2-3.  
 73.  See id. (including preventative measures such as home confinement at 
night and on days off when the person in question has established residence and 
has a permanent job, electronic monitoring, restraining orders, periodic 
appearances in court on specific dates and subject to special conditions set my 
judge, and a few others).   
 74.  Id. at 3.  
 75.  See INST. SOU DA PAZ, What We Do (2013), http://www.soudapaz.org/en/ 
what-we-do (asserting that this institution is a non-governmental organization that 
works to reduce levels of violence in Brazil and contributes to public policy for 
security and violence prevention).  
 76.  See Pre-trial Detainees in Brazil, supra note 9, at 8; see also FED. SUP. CT. 
(Braz.), Custody Hearing Project Reaches 14 States with the Inclusion of Piauí 
(Aug. 24, 2015), http://www2.stf.jus.br/portalStfInternacional/cms/destaques 
Clipping.php?sigla=portalStfDestaque_en_us&idConteudo=298373 (finding that 
these states have adopted the program: São Paulo, Espírito Santo, Maranhão, 
Minas Gerais, Mato Grosso, Rio Grande do Sul, Paraná, Amazonas, Tocantins, 
Goiás, Paraíba, Pernambuco, Ceará, and Piauí).   
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legality of the arrest; (b) determine the necessity of pretrial detention, 
orders release on bail or the detainee’s own recognizance pending 
trial, or imposes measures on the detainee, short of detention, to 
ensure appearance in court; and (c) detects torture and ill-treatment.77 
The implementation has proven successful in certain states; however, 
numerous states have not implemented them.78 Not surprisingly, 
those regions that began to grant prompt custody hearings have seen 
a significant decrease in pretrial detainees; as opposed to those that 
have not done so.79 It has also been noted that this implementation 
functions more as a public policy initiative rather than substantial 
law, which means States are not obligated to comply with it.80 
2. Constitution 
Brazil enacted its current Constitution on October 5, 1988.81 
Article V enumerates an extensive list of individual and collective 
fundamental rights and guarantees.82 Additionally, the Constitution 
declares that all fundamental rights must have an immediate 
application, and a citizen can claim a violation of one of these rights 
if either the legislative or executive branch fails to implement it.83 
Most importantly, the judiciary must examine and uphold any threat 
or violation of a civil right.84 
 
 77.  See Pre-trial Detainees in Brazil, supra note 9, at 8.  
 78.  See Brazil: Prison Crisis, supra note 65 (noting that only two states, 
Maranhão and São Paulo, have begun pilot programs to provide all arrestees 
pretrial custody hearings).  
 79.  Id. (noting that in one state, judges have found that pre-trial detention 
unwarranted in approximately fifty percent of cases).  
 80.  See Pre-trial Detainees in Brazil, supra note 9, at 8. 
 81.  See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] (Braz.) (ratified Oct. 
5, 1988).  
 82.  See, e.g., id. art. 5, I-III (providing equal protection for men and women; 
prohibiting punishment without basis in law; and prohibiting torture, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment). 
 83.  See id. art. 5, par. 1 (“The provisions defining fundamental rights and 
guarantees are immediately applicable.”); ONE IN FIVE, supra note 25, at 37 
(explaining that individuals may bring claims directly to federal court alleging 
improper regulation or implementation of an enumerated right). 
 84.  See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 5, XXXV (Braz.) 
(guaranteeing judicial review of any alleged infraction of a protected right); see 
also ONE IN FIVE, supra note 25, at 41 (explaining that the Supremo Tribunal 
Federal is Brazil’s highest judicial authority regarding constitutional 
interpretation). 
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Even though Brazil’s Constitution identifies the judicial remedy of 
habeas corpus85 in cases of unlawful detention,86 there is no 
requirement or guarantee that the detainee’s petition will be 
reviewed or granted.87 Not only is the right to habeas corpus found in 
Brazil’s Constitution, it is also found in the country’s criminal 
procedure code.88 In addition, the criminal procedure code lists the 
types of behavior that may be considered unlawful detention.89 
However, even when an unlawful detention exists, petitions are 
usually not granted.90 
As a result, people detained for lower-level crimes, those related to 
drug or theft offenses, get placed in pretrial detention with high-level 
criminals, those who have committed murder or rape, and even serve 
time for offenses that do not require prison time if convicted.91 This 
negative implication of the law contributes to the high risk of torture 
by police officials while in custody and generates high overcrowding 
rates.92 
 
 85.  Habeas Corpus, THE LECTRIC LAW LIBRARY, http://www.lectlaw.com/def/ 
h001.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2016) (“[A] judicial mandate to a prison official 
ordering that an inmate be brought to the court so it can be determined whether or 
not that person is imprisoned lawfully and whether or not he should be released 
from custody.”).  
 86.  See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 5, § LXVIII 
(Braz.). 
 87.  See Brazil: Protect Detainees in Police Custody, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 
25, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/25/brazil-protect-detainees-police-
custody#_ftnref13 [hereinafter Brazil: Protect Detainees] (acknowledging that a 
defendant’s only opportunity to present evidence to a judge with respect to 
unlawful custodial arrest, will only occur if that person testifies at trial, which can 
occur after months of detention).  
 88.  See CÓDIGO DE PROCESO PENAL [C.P.C.] [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE] 
arts. 647-667 (Braz.) (proscribing conditions where a habeas petition must be 
granted, and establishing filing and appellate procedures for habeas petitions). 
 89.  Id. art. 648 (listing instances where detention is not afforded with good 
cause, the detention exceeds the length of time provided by law, the detention was 
ordered by someone who lacked authority, or the detainee was wrongfully denied 
bail).  
 90.  Id.  
 91.  See Brazil: Prison Crisis, supra note 65 (presenting a case where a man 
spent more than two months in jail waiting to see a judge for allegedly buying a 
stolen motorcycle, even though a conviction of this charge would not have 
included prison time).   
 92.  See id. (stating that inmates who are pretrial detainees, are at the highest 
risk of ill treatment during the first stages of detention); see also MARINER & 
CAVALLARO, supra note 42, at 26 (finding that prisoners who have not received a 
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D. LACK OF CUSTODY HEARING LEADS TO OVERCROWDING AND 
TORTURE 
The Brazilian Prison System has been under scrutiny by top 
United Nations Officials, including the Special Rapporteur on torture 
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.93 In 
a recent visit, the Special Rapporteur identified overcrowding as the 
most pressing issue affecting Brazilian prisons.94 Sadly, this issue 
stems back for several years.95 In 2001, one report concluded that 
prisons meant to hold one hundred and forty-five thousand detainees 
were actually holding over two hundred thousand.96 By June 2014, 
Brazil’s NCPCP observed that prison population was 161% 
overcapacity.97 A center for human rights found that the Brazilian 
prison population increased by seventy-four percent from 2005 to 
2012.98 The disparate rate of prisoners to designated space vary by 
 
sentence constitute roughly one-third of the inmate population).  
 93.  See Brazil Must Address Prison Overcrowding and Implement Measures 
Against Torture – UN Expert, UN NEWS CTR. (Aug. 14, 2015),  
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51644#.Vi1gEBCrR0u 
[hereinafter Brazil Must Address Prison] (observing that the continuous 
atmosphere of chaos and tension in Brazilian prisons, coupled with the lack of a 
robust policy against torture, will likely perpetuate and exacerbate the problem of 
inhumane treatment of prisoners).  
 94.  Id. (noting that certain prisons were more than three times over capacity, 
contributing to an atmosphere of violence and tension).  
 95.  See Inhumane, Ineffective, Intolerable: Brazil’s Prison System, COUNCIL 
ON HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS (Aug. 26, 2010), http://www.coha.org/inhumane-
ineffective-intolerable-brazil%E2%80%99s-prison-system/ [hereinafter Inhumane, 
Ineffective, Intolerable] (stemming over twenty years). 
 96.  See Tackling the Chaos in Brazil’s Prisons, ECONOMIST (Feb. 22, 2001), 
http://www.economist.com/node/511505 (reporting that overcrowding conributed 
to daily prison riots and mass escapes).  
 97.  See MINISTÉRIO DA JUSTIÇA CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA [MINISTRY 
OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUSTICE], Novo Diagnóstico de Pessoas Presas 
No Brasil [New Statistics of Prisoners in Brazil] 6 (June 2014), 
http://www.cnj.jus.br/images/imprensa/pessoas_presas_no_brasil_final.pdf (noting 
a prisoner vacancy deficit of over 206,000 prisoners); see also MINISTÉRIO DA 
JUSTIÇA DEPARTAMENTO PENITECIÁRIO NACIONAL [MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, 
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL PENITENTIARIES], Levantamento Nacional de 
Informações Penitenciárias [National Survey of Penitentiary Information] 30 
(June 2015), http://www.justica.gov.br/noticias/mj-divulgara-novo-relatorio-do-
infopen-nesta-terca-feira/relatorio-depen-versao-web.pdf (“In other words, in a 
space designed to house 10 people, there are approximately 16 individuals 
incarcerated”). 
 98.  U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, Mapa do Encarcamento: Os Jovens do 
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state; however, research shows that most states are overwhelmingly 
filling their prisons past capacity.99 
Brazilian prison conditions have not improved in over a decade 
despite the federal government’s acknowledgement of the grim 
situation.100 Overcrowding has lead to several other issues in Brazil’s 
Penal System,101 but undoubtedly, another major issue arising out of 
both the lack of custody hearings and overcrowding is use of torture 
by prison officials.102 
For instance, visits to several institutions located in São Paulo, Rio 
de Janeiro, Espírito Santo, and Goiás documented repeated and 
consistent beatings of inmates and other ill treatment during police 
custody, such as requiring prisoners to sleep in unsanitary cells 
without proper access to water or food.103 Additionally, the Special 
Rapporteur found that prison personnel frequently used pepper spray, 
noise bombs, tear gas, and rubber bullets on prisoners.104 One famous 
method of extracting confessions from suspects is the “parrot’s 
perch” (pau de arara), where a detainee is hung upside down and 
then beaten until he or she gives the officials the information they are 
 
Brasil [Map of Incarcerations: The Youth of Brazil] 25 (June 5, 2015), 
http://www.pnud.org.br/arquivos/encarceramento_WEB.pdf (noting an increase 
from 296,919 prisoners in 2005 to 515,482 in 2012). 
 99.  The State Let Evil Take Over, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 19, 2015), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/10/19/state-let-evil-take-over/prison-crisis-
brazilian-state-pernambuco (explaining that the Pernambuco’s prison system is the 
most overcrowded in Brazil with almost 32,000 prisoners in facilities designed for 
10,000); see also Carandiru and the Scandal, supra note 33 (finding that in Cadeia 
Pública Riamundo Vidal Pessoa 900 detainees were held in the men’s wing that  
was designed to hold 100 people). 
 100.  See Inhumane, Ineffective, Intolerable, supra note 95 (failing to produce a 
meaningful remedy that can lower incarceration rate or fix the judicial system).  
 101.  Brazil must address prison, supra note 93 (“This leads to chaotic 
conditions inside the facilities, and greatly impacts [sic] on the living conditions of 
inmates and their access to legal defence, health care, psycho-social support, work 
and education opportunities, as well as sun, fresh air and recreation.”)  
 102.  See World Report 2015: Brazil, supra note 35 (documenting over 5,000 
complaints of torture between January 2012 and June 2014, 84% were incidents at 
police stations, prisons, and juvenile detention centers).   
 103.  See World Report 2013: Brazil, supra note 11 (noting that prisoner 
mistreatment in Brazilian detention centers and police stations are chronic and 
system wide).  
 104.  See Brazil must address prison, supra note 93 (indicating the likelihood of 
this trend rising in both numbers and severity if the country continues to not hold 
officials accountable for prisoner abuse).   
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seeking.105 These routine practices have become so ominous that 
even Brazil’s Minister of Justice, José Eduardo Cardozo, has called it 
a “medieval prison system.”106 
Nonetheless, Brazil has recently taken a step to help monitor the ill 
treatment of prisoners.107 In 2013, President Dilma Roussef created 
the National System to Prevent and Combat Torture, which is a two-
body system aimed at monitoring detention centers and assisting 
people who are being deprived of their liberty.108 Unfortunately, 
because this legislation is new, there are no studies to show how its 
legal oversight is holding states accountable for torture against 
detainees.109 
E. BRAZIL’S OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: ARTICLE 
9(3) AND ARTICLE 7 OF THE ICCPR 
The right to be brought promptly before a judge upon arrest is an 
established concept in international law.110 Particularly, this 
fundamental human right is solidified in the United Nations 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), 
which Brazil has ratified.111 The ICCPR was adopted on December 
19, 1966 by the United Nations General Assembly and was created 
 
 105.  See Inhumane, Ineffective, Intolerable, supra note 95. 
 106.  Carandiru and the scandal, supra note 33 (“We have a medieval prison 
system, which not only violates human rights, it does not allow for the most 
important element of a penal sanction, which is social reintegration.”). 
 107.  See, e.g., Brazilian NPM law creates new system to prevent torture, APT 
(Aug. 27, 2013), http://www.apt.ch/en/news_on_prevention/brazilian-npm-law-
creates-new-system-to-prevent-torture/#.VludG9-rR0s. SPADER: Add supporting 
parenthetical.  
 108.  See Lei No. 122.847, de 2 de Agosto de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 05.08.2013 (Braz.) (creating the National Committee to Prevent and 
Combat Torture, and the National Mechanism for Preventing and Combatting 
Torture).  
 109.  See Brazil: Protect Detainees, supra note 87 (predicting that new entity 
will be dedicated to tracking cases or torture and ill treatment).  
 110.  See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 9(3), Dec. 16, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (“Anyone arrested or detained on a 
criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer 
authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a 
reasonable time or to release.”); see also Canineu, supra note 70 (arguing that a 
detainee’s right to go before a judge is crucial to ensure that the detainee’s arrest, 
treatment, and ongoing detention are lawful).  
 111.  Id. (ratified on April 24, 1992). 
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to secure the civil and political rights of citizens whose countries are 
party to it.112 This covenant also establishes the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee (“The Committee”)105 who receives 
periodic reports from the ratified parties demonstrating the measures 
they have taken to abide by the law.113 
1. Article 9 
Article 9 of the ICCPR recognizes the essential right to liberty and 
security of a person and protection against arbitrary arrest or 
detention.114 Specifically, Article 9(3) establishes that “[A]nyone 
arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly 
before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial 
power. . . .”115 The Committee has determined that the delay between 
the arrest of an accused and the time before he is brought before a 
judicial authority “should not exceed a few days,”116 even during 
states of emergency.117 The Committee has declared that a prompt 
judicial hearing must be asserted “in all cases without exception.”118 
 
 112.  See STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW 34 
(2006) (finding that the ICCPR is a legitimate law-making process, and it is 
binding in the acceptance by states).   
105 See id. at 266 (consisting of eighteen members elected by the parties on the 
basis of their expertise in the field of human rights and who are not representatives 
of the particular governments).   
 113.  See id. (noting that Committee members often question state reports, 
request supplemental information, take official notice of extrinsic evidence, or 
other evidence submitted by non-state sources); FAQ: The Covenant on Civil & 
Political Rights (ICCPR), ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/faq-covenant-civil-
political-rights-iccpr (last updated Apr. 2014) (noting that the Committee addresses 
recommendations or concerns in  “Concluding Observations” by the Committee).  
 114.  ICCPR, supra note 110, art. 9.   
 115.  Id. art. 9(3).  
 116.  U.N. Human Rights Comm., International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights General Comment No. 35, ¶ 33, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35 (Dec. 16, 2014) 
[hereinafter General Comment No. 35] (indicating that forty-eight hours after an 
arrest is usually sufficient to have a judicial hearing; any delay longer than that, 
must be “absolutely exceptional and be justified under the circumstances”); see 
also U.N. Human Rights Comm., Freemantle v. Jamaica, Communication No. 
625/1995, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/68/D/625/1995 (Mar. 31, 2000) (indicating four 
days as not prompt).   
 117.  See Canineu, supra note 70 (citing the ICCPR and other cases by the 
Committee).  
 118.  General Comment No. 35, supra note 116, at ¶32 (stating that the 
requirement applies even before formal charges have been asserted so long as the 
person is arrested or detained on suspicion of criminal activity). 
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2. Article 7 
When it comes to human rights violations against torture, Article 7 
of the ICCPR establishes that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture 
or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”119 In 
addition, the Committee has provided that Article 7 exists for the 
protection of dignity, physical and mental integrity of the 
individual.120 Most importantly, Article 7 of the ICCPR is 
unequivocal.121 This means that a party to the covenant cannot find 
any exceptions to this prohibition; therefore, they must strictly 
adhere to it at all times.122 Lastly, the Committee establishes that 
Article 7 prohibits acts causing both physical and mental pain to the 
victim.123 
III. ANALYSIS 
According to some scholars, Brazil’s criminal procedure code and 
Constitution provide prisoners with the utmost respect for human 
rights and dignity.124 However, in practice, Brazil’s most important 
laws fail to provide its citizens with due process upon being detained 
and fail to protect the value of human life while in custody.125 
 
 
 119.  ICCPR, supra note 110, art. 7.   
 120.  U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 20, Compilation of 
General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights 
Treaty Bodies, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I) (May 27, 2008) 
[hereinafter General Comment No. 20] (affirming the State’s duty to provide every 
citizen this protection through legislative measures or any other measures 
necessary to secure this right). 
 121.  See id. at ¶3 (affirming the Committee’s position that an individual should 
never be subjected to torture under any circumstances).  
 122.  See id. (stating that no crisis, not even a terrorist emergency or a time of 
war, justifies a departure from Article 7 standards).  
 123.  See id. at ¶5 (“The Committee likewise observes that no justification or 
extenuating circumstances may be invoked to excuse a violation of article 7 for 
any reasons, including those based on an order from a superior officer or public 
authority.”).  
 124.  See, e.g., ONE IN FIVE, supra note 25 (stating that the Brazilian 
Constitution includes a long list of rights and freedoms secured by every citizen to 
promote the human rights listed in international law). 
 125.  See id. (finding that Brazil has some of the most progressive laws for the 
protection of human rights in the region, yet there is a huge gap between “[t]he 
spirit of these laws and their implementation”). 
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Brazil’s lack of uniformity in its criminal law, its unrestricted 
judicial system, and unsupervised law enforcement, is violating both 
Article 9(3) and Article 7 of the ICCPR.126 The Articles’ explicit 
language, along with the Committee’s strict recommendations, 
demonstrate that Brazil does not adhere to this international law. By 
holding detainees in pretrial detention for long periods, the Brazilian 
judicial system does not allow detainees to receive a fair evaluation 
of the merits of their detention. Instead, the Brazilian judicial system 
fosters torture of detainees while in custody.127 Further, it subjects 
detainees to overcrowded conditions that cause severe mental 
anguish and physical pain.128 Because Brazil has ratified the ICCPR, 
it must immediately abide by these provisions.129 By failing to abide 
by these provisions, Brazil’s Criminal Procedure Code deprives 
Brazilian citizens of the fundamental right of liberty and security. 
A. VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 9 OF THE ICCPR: BRAZIL’S CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE CODE AND CONSTITUTION FAIL TO PROVIDE A 
FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHT 
The right to liberty and security is outlined in the ICCPR, one of 
the most binding international law instruments.130 As the Committee 
mentions, this right is afforded to “everyone,” including those 
suspected of criminal activity, or those with pending criminal 
charges.131 The basis for this provision is to bring the detainee under 
judicial control immediately.132 The overall goal of Article 9 is to 
avoid the deprivation of liberty133 because it can trigger a violation of 
other human rights.134 Nonetheless, the majority of Brazilian 
 
 126.  See id. (acknowledging that Brazil is likely violating its own constitutional 
provisions on human rights through its biased judicial system and lack of adequate 
oversight).  
 127.  See generally, supra Part II. C-E. 
 128.  See id. See generally supra Part II. C-E.   
 129.  See generally supra note 89.   
 130.  ICCPR, supra note 110, art. 9. 
 131.  General Comment No. 35, supra note 116, at ¶4 (assuring the right applies 
to all persons deprived of liberty, not just those facing criminal charges). 
 132.  See id. at ¶32.  
 133.  Id. at ¶3, ¶5 (noting that liberty concerns bodily confinement, not the 
freedom of action; and listing examples of deprivation of liberty, including police 
custody, remand detention, imprisonment after conviction, etc.). 
 134.  Id. at ¶2 (“Liberty and security of person are precious for their own sake, 
and also because the deprivation of liberty and security of person have historically 
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prisoners are detained without the opportunity to promptly challenge 
their detention in front of an independent judge, a contradictory 
practice to the ICCPR.135 
A critical function of a prompt custody hearing is for the judge to 
determine whether or not the detainee has been legally detained, as 
well as, for the detainee to report any police abuse at the time of the 
arrest.136 Furthermore, it allows the individual to ask the judge to be 
released on his or her own recognizance (“O.R.”),137 or on bail while 
formal charges are pending.138 Nonetheless, Brazilian prisoners are 
not afforded with this protection because most states do not bring the 
detained individual before a judge for three months after the initial 
arrest.139 Thus, a big reason why Brazil is not in compliance with 
Article 9 of the ICCPR is because its criminal procedure code uses 
discretionary language.140 The country’s current practice allows 
judges to detain many individuals in pretrial detention without giving 
them the opportunity to physically appear in court, a crucial aspect of 
Article 9.141 
 
been principal means for impairing the enjoyment of other rights.”).   
 135.  See Brazil: Protect Detainees, supra note 87; see also Brazil must address 
prison, supra note 93 (arguing for immediate expansion in the use of custody 
hearings nationwide because it can reduce the number of pretrial detainees by 
40%).   
 136.  General Comment No. 35, supra note 116, at ¶34 (“[P]hysical presence of 
detainees at the hearing gives the opportunity for inquiry into the treatment that 
they received in custody.”); see also Canineu, supra note 70 (noting that the risk of 
ill treatment is often highest during the first hours of detention, and that hearing 
delays negatively impact investigations of abuse).  
 137.  See Paul Bergman, How Judges Decide to Release You on Your Own 
Recognizance, or “OR”, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/how-
judges-decide-release-own-recognizance.html (last accessed on Nov. 15, 2015) 
(stating that an O.R. is a “no-cost bail” release or written promise to appear in 
court as required).   
 138.  See Brazil: Protect Detainees, supra note 87 (arguing that the delay will 
make a detainee’s critical evidence, such as access to witnesses, voluntary 
statements, and most importantly, any accounts of abuse by police officials, 
disappear).  
 139.  E.g., Brazil: Prison Crisis, supra note 65 (observing that some detainees 
accused of non-drug charges can wait up to nine months before they see a judge).  
 140.  See generally supra Part II C(a) (explaining how language requiring an 
arrest report within 24 hours, but not actual production of the prisoner, leads to 
excessive delay and police abuse).  
 141.  General Comment No. 35, supra note 116, at ¶34.   
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1. Deprivation of Liberty Under Brazil’s Criminal Procedure Code 
Under Article 306 of Brazil’s criminal procedure code, courts are 
systematically violating the presumption of innocence142 and in turn, 
violating the ICCPR.143 With the implementation of this law, the 
detainee is refrained from disputing the detention. Additionally, the 
law restricts detainees from being represented by an attorney who 
can argue that the evidence does not amount to probable cause for an 
arrest.144 As soon as the detainee is placed under pretrial detention 
without seeing a judge, or placed in pretrial detention for a minor 
offense that otherwise would not carry a sentence, Brazil is depriving 
that individual of his liberty.145 
Being brought promptly before a judge has no exceptions, not 
even a detainee’s choice or ability to assert it.146 Moreover, according 
to the Committee, “[I]t is inherent to the proper exercise of judicial 
power that it be exercised by an authority which is independent, 
objective and impartial in relation to the issues dealt with.”147 In 
Brazil’s case, the authority is neither objective nor impartial to the 
issues because the judge and the police are the only ones evaluating 
the arrest and detention of the individual.148 Brazil cannot claim that 
its criminal procedure code is objective and impartial because the 
only side the judge gets to consider is the police’s.149 In order to 
 
 142.  CÓDIGO DE PROCESO PENAL [C.P.C.] [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 
306, §1 (Braz.); see also ONE IN FIVE, supra note 25 (detailing systemic abuses by 
judges and courts that evidence judicial bias, corruption, and willful violation of 
Brazilian law). 
 143.  E.g., Brazil: Protect Detainees, supra note 87 (noting that the criminal 
code allows police to only submit an arrest report within twenty four hours, rather 
than bringing in the person in front of the judge).  
 144.  See Canineu, supra note 70 (“It is unjustifiable that a democracy like 
Brazil has disregarded this fundamental right for so long”). 
 145.  See Brazil: Prison Crisis, supra note 65 (stating that the use of pretrial 
detention may only be considered if the suspect is accused of a crime that carries a 
sentence of more than four years, if the suspect has already been convicted of a 
crime, if the suspect is facing domestic violence charges, or if the suspect’s 
identity is at issue).  
 146.  General Comment No. 35, supra note 116, at ¶32. 
 147.  Id.  
 148.  See Canineu, supra note 70 (evaluating the legality of the arrest and 
detention based solely on the written documents provided by police within twenty-
four hours of the arrest).   
 149.  Id. (stating that the suspect does not get to raise objections until they 
appear in court, often months after the initial arrest). 
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abide by Article 9(3) of the ICCPR, Brazil must explicitly grant a 
custody hearing to an individual, including a physical presence in the 
courtroom, with an attorney.150 Article 9 does not allow the judge to 
determine a suspect’s custody status based only on a predisposed 
report.151 Brazil’s criminal procedure code must provide that every 
individual who is arrested in flagrante delicto will promptly see a 
judge under all circumstances.152 
As previously mentioned, Article 9(3) stipulates that “[A]nyone 
arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly 
before a judge. . . .”153 The Committee has not exactly defined the 
word “promptly;” however, it has agreed that forty-eight hours is 
customarily sufficient to transport the individual and prepare for a 
judicial hearing.154 The Committee has also concluded that any 
pretrial detention lasting longer than forty-eight hours without a 
custodial hearing, must “remain absolutely exceptional and be 
justified under the circumstances.”155 Yet in Brazil, pretrial detention 
repeatedly lasts more than forty-eight hours. Often, pretrial detention 
can last  an average of five months,156 sometimes without a charge or 
conviction.157 The Committee makes it clear that forty-eight hours is 
plenty of time to bring the suspect in front of a judge, which is why 
 
 150.  General Comment No. 35, supra note 116, at ¶34 (entitling suspect to legal 
assistance of his choice during the mandatory initial custody hearing). 
 151.  Id. (stating that the individual must appear physically before the judge to 
determine the legality of his detention and allow for inquiry into custodial 
treatment). 
 152.  Id. at ¶32.  
 153.  ICCPR, supra note 110, art. 9(3). 
 154.  General Comment No. 35, supra note 116, at ¶33 (adding that delays 
should never exceed a few days from the time of arrest, and that only exceptional 
circumstances warrant delay longer than forty-eight hours); see also Kovsh v. 
Belarus, No. 1787/2008, ¶¶7.3-7.5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/107/D/1787/2008 (Mar. 
28, 2013) (noting that pretrial detention should be kept as short as possible; sixty-
one to seventy-two hours was not a reasonable delay without a valid reason or 
explanation). 
 155.  General Comment No. 35, supra note 116, at ¶33; see also Fillastre and 
Bizouarn v. Bolivia, No. 336/1988, ¶6.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/43/D/336/1988 (Sep. 
27, 1988) (holding that financial restrictions do not justify a ten-day detention 
without a prompt custody hearing).   
 156.  See U.N. Secretariat, Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment on his mission to Brazil, ¶ 
19, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/57/Add.4 (Jan. 29, 2016) [hereinafter Report on the 
Special Rapporteur on torture].  
 157.  See Canineu, supra note 70. 
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Brazil has no valid justification, not even lack of funds, for holding 
thousands of detainees in pretrial detention for months.158 In the past, 
the Committee found that four days is not prompt,159 which likely 
means that three months will not be considered prompt either. 
Therefore, it is crucial that Brazil starts implementing custody 
hearings now, or else more of its citizens will be deprived of their 
liberty.160 
2. Deprivation of Liberty Under Brazil’s Constitution 
Brazil’s Constitution declares that all fundamental rights have an 
immediate application, and if not granted, a citizen can claim a 
violation of that right.161 According to the Constitution, the judiciary 
is to treat all pretrial prisoners as innocent, meaning that detention 
should be last resort.162 Additionally, the Committee has also warned 
that prolonged pretrial detention violates the presumption of 
innocence, and should be avoided at all possible times.163 
As mentioned, the Constitution grants the right to habeas corpus 
in cases of unlawful arrest and deprivation of liberty, and the 
criminal procedure code delineates exactly when unlawful detention 
 
 158.  See Kovsh v. Belarus, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/107/D/1787/2008 (noting 
additionally that a “promptness” evaluation begins at the time of arrest, not when 
the person actually arrives at the place of detention). 
 159.  See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Freemantle v. Jamaica, Communication 
No. 625/1995, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/68/D/625/1995 (Mar. 31, 2000) (articulating 
that Jamaica failed to provide proper justification for the delay in presenting the 
suspect to a judge). 
 160.  E.g., Brazil: Approve Critical Justice, supra note 61 (“The experiences of 
states with custody hearings demonstrate that those programs both help guarantee 
that the person’s human rights will be respected and produce promising results.”).  
 161.  See supra Part II C(b) (discussing the Constitution’s critical functions and 
possible remedies for fundamental rights violations). 
 162.  CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 5, §65 (Braz.); see 
also ONE IN FIVE, supra note 25 (prohibiting arbitrary arrest and detention in 
Brazil); Andrea Dip, Behind Brazil’s Arrest First, Ask Later Policy, INSIGHT 
CRIME (Feb. 24, 2015), http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/brazil-pretrial-
detention-prison-population (stating that “[u]nder constitutional law, pretrial 
detention must only be used if there is concrete evidence that the suspect will slow 
down  the judicial proceedings in some way, if they are a flight risk, if they 
committed a crime against the national economy, or in order to guarantee a public 
order.”).  
 163.  General Comment No. 35, supra note 116, at ¶37 (stating that even if 
delay becomes necessary, the court or judge should seek an effective alternative to 
prolonged pretrial detention).  
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occurs.164 Brazil’s Constitution lists the right of habeas corpus as a 
fundamental guarantee; yet, Brazilian detainees who file for a writ 
habeas corpus rarely get it granted.165 Thus, detention no longer 
becomes a last measure practice, but rather the method of resolving 
any arrest, without the opportunity to dispute it.166 It is estimated that 
forty-one percent of prisoners in Brazil should not even be 
detained.167 Furthermore, by the time a detainee seeks a writ of 
habeas corpus, many of the unlawful conditions have already taken 
place, such as: exceeding the length of time provided in the law, the 
detainee was wrongfully denied bail, or the detention was without 
good cause.168 
Ironically, a writ of habeas corpus should be granted if a 
deprivation of liberty occurs, such as the ones previously listed; 
nonetheless, many of those conditions occur because custody 
hearings are not granted to begin with.169 If a detainee had access to a 
prompt custody hearing upon arrest, the issue of exceeding the 
detention’s length of time would not be a problem because (1) the 
individual would be made aware of the charge and the potential 
sentence it carries, (2) the judge might release him until trial, where 
he would not have to serve a pretrial sentence, or (3) the charge itself 
might not even be one deemed of incarceration.170 
Similarly, a detention without good cause would have already 
been predetermined at the custody hearing; therefore, it would 
decrease the chances of a detainee filing for this petition and then 
 
 164.  See generally Part II C(b) (exploring habeas corpus as a legal remedy to 
arbitrary arrest and prolonged pretrial detention).   
 165.  E.g., Canineu, supra note 70 (showing that a detainee will only see a judge 
if he goes to trial, diminishing his chances of fighting the unlawful detention).  
 166.  See ONE IN FIVE, supra note 25 (suggesting that the excessive delay in 
holding custody hearings, a blatant legal violation, has become the functional 
norm).  
 167.  See Nolen, supra note 7 (citing that lower-level drug offenders and poor 
people are most often the victims of this illegal practice, and have usually already 
spent more time awaiting trial than their sentence is worth).  
 168.  E.g., Brazil: Protect Detainees, supra note 87 (arguing that these delays 
make it more likely that abuse will occur, that evidence of the abuse will be 
compromised, and that such continued abuse will discourage victims from coming 
forward). 
 169.  Id. (suggesting that initial custody hearings would also reduce the number 
of documented issues with habeas corpus).  
 170.  See Nolen, supra note 7. 
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later having it denied.171 Brazil’s failure to grant habeas corpus 
hearings not only violates its own Constitution, but also violates 
Article 9.172 The whole purpose of the law is to ensure liberty and 
security of an individual, and that cannot occur if the State continues 
to detain people without a valid reason.173 
The civil rights outlined in Article 9 are crucial to the enjoyment 
of other human rights, and if violated, it triggers the risk of torture by 
police officials and severe overcrowding in facilities.174 
B. THE SNOWBALL EFFECT: BRAZIL’S VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 7 OF 
THE ICCPR 
The Committee has established that “Prolonged incommunicado 
detention violated Article 9 and would generally be regarded as a 
violation of Article 7.175 Article 9 aims to protect individuals from 
being tortured in the hands of police, stating, “[P]hysical presence of 
detainees at the hearing gives the opportunity for inquiry into the 
treatment that they received in custody.”176 In Brazil’s case, the lack 
of custody hearings has made it easier for police officials to torture 
detainees because they are aware that seeing a judge is not in their 
near future; consequently, making it difficult for the detainee to 
report the abuse.177 Therefore, by violating Article 9 of the ICCPR 
for failure to promptly bring the detainee in front of the judge, Brazil 
is also violating Article 7 of the ICCPR, the Prohibition of Torture, 
 
 171.  See General Comment No. 35, supra note 116, at ¶36 (“If there is no 
lawful basis for continuing the detention, the judge must order release.”).  
 172.  ICCPR, supra note 110, art. 9. 
 173.  See supra Part IV A (detailing the discretionary constitutional and criminal 
procedure measures surrounding custody and habeas corpus that are exploited and 
fail to adequately protect the rights of detainees).  
 174.  See General Comment No. 35, supra note 116, at ¶56 (stating that arbitrary 
detention runs the risks of ill treatment and torture, and that adherence to the 
procedural guarantees of Article 9, likely reduces those risks). 
 175.  See generally supra Part II C (a); see also General Comment No. 35, supra 
note 116, at ¶56 (noting that the lack of information regarding charges against the 
defendant, the lack of access to counsel, and the inability to see a judge constituted 
blatant violations on multiple legal fronts). 
 176.  General Comment No. 35, supra note 116, at ¶34.  
 177.  See Brazil: Reforms Fail to End Torture: Further Steps Needed to Protect 
Detainees, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 26, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/ 
07/28/brazil-reforms-fail-end-torture [hereinafter Brazil: Reforms Fail] (finding 
evidence of sixty-four cases since 2010 of alleged abuse by prison officials).   
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or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.178 
Furthermore, the lack of custody hearings has led to massive 
overcrowding in Brazil’s prisons.179 Since thousands of people are 
getting detained without the opportunity to challenge their arrest, 
pretrial detention is filling up in substantial quantities.180 
Overcrowding restricts detainees from receiving access to food, 
clean water, beds, or proper medical services.181 As a result, prisoners 
have to endure in inhumane living conditions while they wait to see a 
judge for the first time, or have their trial.182 Since Article 7 stipulates 
that torture is not restricted to physical pain, but mental suffering as 
well, it can be argued that Brazil’s overcrowding issue is a violation 
of this right.183 Brazil’s inefficiency to provide adequate prison 
facilities in its country is contradictory to what the Committee has 
outlined in its report.184 
Again, in order for Brazil to adhere to these international law 
standards, it must not allow the torture of detainees by prison 
officials; nor subject its detainees to horrific living conditions while 
in detention.185 
 
 
 178.  ICCPR, supra note 110, art. 7; see also General Comment No. 35, supra 
note 116, at ¶56. 
 179.  See Muggah & Szabo de Carvalho, supra note 13 (indicating that with an 
average of 3,000 new incarcerations each month, the situation is becoming worse 
each day; for example, ten inmates have slept in cells designed for only three 
people).  
 180.  See World Report 2015: Brazil, supra note 35 (estimating that nearly 
175,000 individuals are currently in pre-trial detention).  
 181.  See The State Let Evil Take Over, supra note 99, at 4 (observing a facility 
in Pernambuco where a windowless cell had no beds, so thirty-seven men slept on 
sheets on the floor, and one man slept sitting up).  
 182.  See id. (reiterating Pernambuco’s prisons as “dangerous, unhealthy, and 
inhumane” because of their overcapacity problem).  
 183.  E.g., General Comment No. 20, supra note 120, at ¶5.  
 184.  Id. at ¶2 (citing the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
which stipulates that “All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with 
humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person”). 
 185.  See Brazil Must Address Prison, supra note 93 (discussing the importance 
of international law and Brazil’s need to abide by it); see also Inhumane, 
Ineffective, Intolerable, supra note 95 (attributing daily gang violence in the lives 
of Brazilians to the terrible conditions in prisons). 
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1. Torture Produced Immediately After an Arrest 
Coincidentally, most of the abuse generated by police officials 
against detainees happens within twenty-four hours of the initial 
arrest.186 Police officials know that the detainee will most likely not 
see a judge until months after the arrest; therefore, taking advantage 
of the time lapse to try and torture the detainee into providing a 
confession.187 In 2013, the Brazilian Forum on Public Security 
reported that more than 2,200 people died during police operations, 
an average of six people per day.188 To be more specific on the ill-
treatment, in 2010, Saõ Paulo’s military police arrested a man in 
flagrante delicto for suspicion of drug trafficking.189 Police found 
eighty packets of marijuana in the man’s pocket and later claimed 
that he had “tripped” on his way to the police station, suffering 
injuries to his neck and eye.190 Three months later at his first judicial 
hearing, both the suspect and two neighbors testified that the police 
beat him until he provided the name a drug trafficker.191 Despite the 
eyewitness testimony, the court closed his case in 2013 for lack of 
sufficient evidence.192 
Human Rights Watch received evidence of an additional sixty-four 
cases of alleged abuse since 2010, where it indicated that prison 
authorities had engaged in “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment” 
against people held in custody.193 Some of the conduct engaged by 
police included severe beatings, threats of physical and sexual 
violence, electric shocks, asphyxiation with plastic bags, and even 
rape.194 
 
 186.  See Brazil: Reforms Fail, supra note 177 (taking “place in various settings, 
including streets and police vehicles, inside private homes during arrests,” and 
most prominently “at police stations and detention centers”).   
 187.  See id. (“So long as detainees wait months to see a judge, they’re far less 
likely to report the abuse they’ve suffered— and by then, the physical evidence 
may well have disappeared.”).  
 188.  See Report on the Special Rapporteur on torture, supra note 156, at ¶60.  
 189.  Id.  
 190.  Id. 
 191.  Id.  
 192.  Id. (finding this outcome the norm, especially in Saõ Paulo, where in 2013, 
the state police office received 122 complaints of torture, none of which resulted in 
the punishment of police involved).  
 193.  See id. (finding forty of these cases reached the level of torture).  
 194.  See Brazil: Reforms Fail, supra note 177 (explaining how this behavior is 
prevalent in many parts of Brazil, including Saõ Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Espírito 
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Another specific example of police induced torture, occurred in 
Rio de Janeiro, where police officials took a sixteen year-old boy to 
the local police station and threatened him with sexual assault.195 
Police shoved his face into a toilet full of waste and forced him to eat 
liquid candle wax until he provided the names of other drug 
traffickers.196 In another instance, a police officer suffocated a 
fifteen-year old boy at the police station with a plastic bag and 
threatened to rape and kill him if he did not reveal where certain drug 
traffickers hid their firearms and drugs.197 
Additionally, when a detainee received a medical examination 
after reporting abuse, the exam was usually conducted in front of 
police officers and critical information was erased from the 
individual’s file, such as fingerprints and photographs of the 
injuries.198 This reduced the likelihood of a detainee succeeding in a 
claim against a police official.199 
2. Overcrowding Generates Torturous Living Conditions 
The Carandiru massacre should have provided a clear message to 
Brazil’s federal government that its criminal procedure code did not 
adequately provide safeguards to its prisoners.200 That major event 
took the lives of one hundred and eleven prisoners, simply because 
the state failed to provide custody hearings and facilities equipped to 
house such a high number of inmates.201 In fact, even after twenty 
years of one of the biggest police-on-civilian massacres, Brazil 
continually demonstrates why it is in violation of Article 7 of the 
ICCPR.202 Currently Brazil detains over five hundred thousand 
inmates, when it only has the capacity to detain about three hundred 
 
Santo, and Paraná). 
 195.  Id.  
 196.  Id.  
 197.  Id. 
 198.  See id. (recommending State authorities issue a policy that would require 
prompt and impartial medical examinations whenever there is a reasonable 
suspicion that a detainee was tortured by prison officials).  
 199.  See id. 
 200.  Fortin, supra note 34 (explaining that after twenty years, similar prisoner 
revolts against overcrowding happen in Brazilian prisons).  
 201.  See supra Part II. A (regarding overcrowding as an illustration of Brazil’s 
prison violence problem). 
 202.  See id. (stating that the past decade has seen reports of physical abuse and 
torture, rape, extrajudicial executions and widespread gang violence).  
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thousand.203 As a result of the overcrowding, Brazilian prisons are 
among the most violent in the world.204 For example, on January 10, 
2013, prison guards at a detention facility in the state of Espírito 
Santo, retaliated against a group of prisoners that were protesting the 
lack of access to water.205 Consequently, the guards made the 
prisoners sit naked on scalding hot floors, where official documents 
showed the detainees suffered serious burns to their buttocks.206 
Witnesses mentioned that if inmates complained about the burns, 
they were immediately beaten and sprayed with pepper spray, and 
the prison authorities suspended the detainees’ visitation rights for 
eight days.207 In this instance, not only were the prisoners already 
being deprived of a fundamental human necessity (water), but they 
were also tortured because of it.208 
The Committee has stated that “[A]rticle 7 relates not only to acts 
that cause physical pain but also to acts that cause mental suffering to 
the victim.”209 With that understanding, Brazil is clearly violating 
Article 7 when it fails to provide adequate living conditions in its 
prison facilities.210 For example, prisons in Amazonas states have 
toilets that are holes on the ground used by ten to fifteen cellmates.211 
In other facilities, legal observers saw open sewers and rotting food 
in corridors and yards.212 In a Minas Gerais prios, thirty detainees 
were kept in a cell full of rats and scabies, without any access to 
sunlight.213 
 
 203.  See Muggah & Szabo de Carvalho, supra note 13. 
 204.  Id. (describing Brazilian prisons as “crumbling facilities where torture, 
sexual violence, and beheading are rampant”).  
 205.  See Brazil: Reforms Fail, supra note 177 (listing several specific cases of 
documented torture by police officials).  
 206.  See id. 
 207.  See id.  
 208.  See id. 
 209.  General Comment No. 20, supra note 120, at ¶5.   
 210.  See The State Let Evil Take Over, supra note 99 (depicting cells with 
“poor sanitation and ventilation, combined with overcrowding and lack of medical 
care, allow disease to spread among inmates.” This includes a high rate of 
prisoners with HIV).   
 211.  See Carandiru and the Scandal, supra note 33 (finding other instances 
where women and minors were detained in the same unit as men).  
 212.  See id. (documenting a prison in Tefé where prisoners complained that a 
poisoned tank filled their cells with venomous waste).  
 213.  See Inhumane, Ineffective, Intolerable, supra note 95. 
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These types of conditions greatly affect the mental state of human 
beings.214 Packing ten bodies in one cell, sometimes forced to sleep 
on top of one another, creates more than just physical pain.215 As 
demonstrated, detainees in Brazilian prisons are being subject to 
extreme mental anguish, a violation of Article 7 of the ICCPR.216 
 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. LEGISLATIVE REFORM CALLING FOR CUSTODY HEARINGS ON A 
FEDERAL LEVEL 
The root of Brazil’s prison system problem begins with a lack of 
custody hearings.217 More specifically the discretionary practice of 
judges determining custody status based only on the police report, 
not the detainee’s presence.218 In fact, the overcrowding in many 
state prisons has become so severe that some Brazilian states have 
recently started to implement custody hearings for detainees.219 Not 
surprisingly, the number of people held in pretrial detention has 
decreased in these states because the judge frequently concluded that 
the individual could be released on bail or did not need to be 
charged.220 
However, it is not enough for some states to implement this 
international obligation, while others do not.221 States are supposed to 
 
 214.  See id.  
 215.  Id.  
 216.  General Comment No. 20, supra note 120, at ¶ 5.   
 217.  See generally supra Part III.D. 
 218.  See generally supra Part III.A (discussing the specific language in Article 
306 of Brazil’s criminal procedure code).  
 219.  See Brazil: Prison Crisis, supra note 65 (stating that both Maranhão and 
Pernambuco have begun implementing custody hearings in their state courts 
through the pilot program).  
 220.  See id. (showing that when judges in Maranhão held custody hearings, 
they found that nearly 50% of the detainees should not be in pretrial detention and 
were ordered release, compared to the release of only 10% of detainees when 
strictly looking at the police report).  
 221.  See Brazil: Protect Detainees, supra note 87 (“The Brazilian government’s 
obligation under this body of law and norms is not only to prevent torture and 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment but also to thoroughly investigate and 
prosecute such acts when they occur—including by making certain that detainees 
are brought before judicial authorities without unnecessary delay.”). 
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implement custody hearings as articulated in Article 9 of the ICCPR; 
therefore, it is crucial that Brazil amends its criminal procedure code 
to allow a prompt custody hearing in person, and for the states to 
have a formal agreement to abide by the Federal legislation.222 A big 
misunderstanding in applying this procedural safeguard is because 
Brazil’s criminal procedure code and Constitution do not expressly 
delineate this right.223 There needs to be a change made to these laws, 
specifically mentioning the physical presence of the detainee at a 
prompt judicial hearing, the assistance of an attorney, a prosecutor 
who is bringing the forth the charges, and a medical expert if needed 
for signs of ill-treatment.224 
Mandating custody hearings is absolutely necessary for Brazil to 
overcome the issue of overcrowding in prisons.225 Congress must 
finally pass a law that guarantees Brazilian citizens a right to a 
custody hearing within twenty-four hours of an arrest. The reason for 
implementing the custody hearing within twenty-four hours instead 
of forty-eight,226 is because of the huge risk of torture that occurs 
within that window of detention. In order to avoid torture against 
prisoners by police officials, the Brazilian Federal Government must 
ensure that its law is written clearly and unequivocally, that way 
judges do not implement it in a way that is beneficial to their 
courtroom or region. 
B. CHANGES TO PRETRIAL DETENTION AND PRISON CONDITIONS 
It is also crucial that 1) those individuals who are arrested of low-
level crimes, such as nonviolent drug offenses, should be released on 
an O.R. or granted bail at the custody hearing, and 2) in the case that 
an individual must be detained in pretrial detention, that the facilities 
separate those detainees who are awaiting trial on high-level crimes, 
 
 222.  See The State Let Evil Take Over, supra note 99 (emphasizing the need for 
Brazil’s Congress to pass a bill that would mandate custody hearings across the 
entire country as established by international law).   
 223.  See supra Part II.A (explaining how the criminal code only allows police 
to bring the report in front of the judge, also how the Constitution only guarantees 
the right to habeas corpus in the deprivation of an unlawful arrest). 
 224.  See The State Let Evil Take Over, supra note 99. 
 225.  See id. (mentioning that the less people in pretrial detention, the more 
room to incarcerate those with serious offenses).  
 226.  General Comment No. 35, supra note 116, ¶33 (advising that forty-eight 
hours is enough time to be considered prompt).  
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such as murder and rape, with those who have other charges such as 
theft of drug possession. 
The implementation of this rule will minimize the risk of torture 
against certain individuals and it will also cut back overcrowding.227 
Implementing adequate facilities will reduce the chances of physical 
and mental torture because more room means inmates will not have 
to sleep in holes, on the ground, or in hammocks.228 The Brazilian 
government should mandate that all state prisons ensure that each 
detainee is provided with the basic necessities, including a bed, 
sufficient food and water, necessary sanitary equipment, lighting, 
ventilation, and medical services.229 
More importantly, Brazil’s Federal Agencies, such as DEPEN, 
must ensure that adequate funding is being used to fix the facilities 
already in place, rather than creating additional facilities, because 
that will run the risk of having more people incarcerated.230 
C. INDEPENDENT BODY OVERSIGHT OF BRAZILIAN TREATMENT OF 
PRISONERS: INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS NEEDS 
TO SANCTION BRAZIL FOR PREVIOUS WRONGDOINGS 
Lastly, it is imperative that Brazil be held accountable for the ill 
treatment and torture of prisoners. Brazil’s mistreatment of prisoners 
and deprivation of liberty cannot be bypassed. 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“IACHR”) along 
with the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, make up the 
Organization of American States, which protects and promotes the 
human rights and freedoms of citizens in the Americas.231 Countries 
in North America and South America, who have ratified the 
convention, including Brazil, are subject to observation by this 
adjudicatory body to determine if any human rights violations are 
occurring within their countries.232 Importantly, this body will only 
hear a case if the party has exhausted all other legal measures, 
 
 227.  See The State Let Evil Take Over, supra note 99. 
 228.  Id.  
 229.  See id.  
 230.  See supra Part II.B.  
 231.  I/A Court History, INTER-AM. CT. HUM. RTS., http://www.corteidh.or.cr/ 
corte/historia.cfm?lang=en.  
 232.  See id. 
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including the State’s failure to abide by the recommendations of the 
Inter-American Commission of Human Rights.233 
There have already been instances in which Brazil’s prison 
conditions are reprimanded by the Inter-Commission of Human 
Rights, yet the recommendations have not been put in place.234 
Although there has been talk about reform and  the president passed 
a law that established the National System to Prevent and Combat 
Torture, there should also be oversight by this nongovernmental 
organization.235 This organization should be able to report 
consistently on the conditions of Brazil’s prisons. This includes 
having access to every prison in the country, documentation of the 
detainees, charges pending against the detainees, medical records, 
access to interviews, and most importantly, the monitoring of police 
guards. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the recent years, Brazil has enjoyed success as a democratic 
superpower.236 Behind that success, however, lie thousands of 
unlawful detentions and inhumane treatment of prisoners.237 The 
Brazilian prison system serves as a vestibule for the unjust treatment 
of Brazilian citizens and the unfair implementation of Brazil’s 
Criminal Procedure Code.238 
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Brazil violates Article 9 of the ICCPR because it fails to grant 
detainees a prompt custody hearing. Brazil further violates Article 7 
of the ICCPR because its failure to provide custody hearings leads to 
prison overcrowding and facilitates police torture of detainees while 
custody.239 International judicial bodies must hold Brazil accountable 
for these violations and must force them to implement federal laws 
that will guarantee Brazilian citizens due process and human dignity. 
As importantly, Brazilian citizens must change their perception of 
detainees.240 Punishment in the current Brazilian Prison System 
outweighs the crime. Lower-level offenders should not have to be 
tortured or even killed by police officials simply for being placed in 
detention that was unlawful to begin with. In addition, political 
leaders in Brazil must implement policies that ensure fair, safe, and 
torture-free prison conditions. An impartial judiciary is the bedrock 
for liberty. Brazil must ensure that it fosters a judiciary that meets 
international standards in the face of Brazil’s rising national 
notoriety. By failing to implement the international standards that the 
ICCPR espouses, Brazil will quickly lose its edge as a global leader. 
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